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That political parties have been the central institutions of demo­
cratic governments at least since the enfranchisement of the working 
class is well known. Disraeli  wrote, " I  believe that without party 
p a r l i a m e n ta ry  government i s  im p o ss ib le "  (Rose, 197**: 1). 
Schattschneider (19**2: 1) tells us that "modern democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of party," while to Sartori (1976: ix ),  "Parties are the 
central intermediate and intermediary structures between society and 
government." Although as Rose ( 1969) points out, "operational control 
of government" by parties is often assumed rather than demonstrated, the 
literary theory (as Bagehot would have it) or the dominant ideal-type or 
myth of democratic government in Western Europe has been the model of 
party government. While party government has not been accepted quite so 
readily as a description of government in the United States, it has been 
widely accepted as an ideal there as well (Kirkpatrick, 1950). With 
varying degrees of sophistication and with more or fewer caveats, elabo­
rations, and qualifications, this has been true of political scientists, 
journalists, and the general public. The character, as well as the 




























































































and in providing effective long term stability and leadership, is most 
commonly attributed to the state of the parties and party system 
(Briggs, 1965; Allum, 1973).
Like other idealisations of government — for example first that
\
the king and then that the legislature ruled —  the party government 
model is both descriptive and justificatory.1 At the descriptive level, 
the party government model assigns to political parties a number of key 
functions in the governing process, including mobilisation and 
channeling of support, formulation of alternatives, recruitment and 
replacement of leadership, and, when in power, implementation of policy 
and control over its administration. At the normative level, the party 
government model implies a particular view of democracy, in which the 
system is made democratic by the electoral role of the parties.  
Structures or individuals other than parties and their leaders could 
perform the functions attributed to parties and could contribute to the 
governing of society, but only parties offer the whole public a choice 
among comprehensive and comprehensible alternatives. An e lectora lly  
victorious party or coalition of parties is entitled to control the 
decision making and implementing functions of government because it has 
been authorised by the whole people to do so (Ranney, 1962).
The preceding paragraph ignores many thorny problems. Like other 
idealisations, the party government model is oversimplified, and is not 
intended to be taken as a complete description of any particular govern­
ment. Its English origins are quite obvious, and both its descriptive 
and its  normative elements require modification before they can be 
adapted to other political systems. Nonetheless, until recently it was 





























































































rate description of the operation of European, i f  not necessarily of 
American, democracy.
In recent years, however, widespread concern has been expressed 
generally about the governability of industrial or post-industrial  
societies, and particularly about the ab i l ity  of parties and party 
governments to cope with contemporary problems (Crozier, 1975). A 
variety of events, social changes, and results of academic research have 
called the party government model into question, both normatively and 
empirically. Heightened awareness of the independence of bureaucrats 
and of their relationships with organised interests has raised the 
question of whether parties have been, or can be, in effective control 
of policy. The broadening of government functions and the proliferation 
of governmental and quasi-governmental agencies indeed has raised the 
question of whether anyone can exercise comprehensive control. The rise 
of social groupings and issues not reflected in existing party systems 
has introduced new strains that threaten the stab i l i ty  of existing  
institutions and raised doubts regarding the adequacy of representation 
by parties (Inglehart, 1977), while the effective penetration of  
organised groups into the governmental apparatus has challenged the 
assumption that parties are necessary for representation. Moreover, the 
suspicion that partisan bickering is responsible, at least in part, for 
the apparent incapacity of western governments to deal effectively with 
contemporary problems has raised doubts about the very desirability of 
party government (Finer, 1975).
These doubts have contributed to a feeling that there is a c r is is  




























































































threatening the survival of party government and of democracy. This
suggestion raises questions clustering in three main categories. 
Firstly, to what extent, and under what circumstances, do governments 
conform to the party government model? Put somewhat infelicitously, 
what is the level of "party governmentness" of contemporary regimes, how 
is it to be explained, and, projecting into the future, what changes in 
party governmentness should be expected on the basis of other political, 
social, economic, and cultural developments? Secondly, how and under 
what circumstances is the level or organisation of party government 
related to a po l i t ica l  system's capacity and potential for survival? 
Thirdly, is party government necessary for democracy or, less demand- 
ingly, is party government the only alternative to authoritarian, auto­
cratic, or dictatorial government? How much party government is there; 
can it  survive; should one care?
These questions could be approached as historical descriptive prob­
lems to be addressed relatively atheoretically. There is much st i l l  to 
be said about the role of parties in the governing of past and present 
societies at a purely descriptive level. I f  valid cross-national 
comparisons are to be made, i f  events are to be explained, and 
especially i f  an assessment of the consequences of potential or future 
events rather than only those that, have already occurred is to be 
attempted, however, a more developed theoretical framework w i l l  be 
necessary. In this paper, I want to explore one possible such 
framework. The remainder of the paper is divided into three main 
sections. The f irst  section is concerned with the choice of an overall 
theoretical approach, or paradigm. The second section then addresses 




























































































underlined in the last paragraph. Finally, the purpose of the third 
section is to relate these concepts to one another, drawing theoretical 
connections among them and suggesting hypotheses and a framework for 
interpretation. Although examples will be given when possible, since 
this is primarily a theoretical paper rigorous tests of hypotheses will  
be left to future research.
Choice of Paradigm
Before any definitional problems can be resolved or theoretical  
propositions advanced, one must choose the paradigm within which the 
work w i l l  take place. This involves deciding on the nature of the 
universe to be explained or studied —  the "units" or "things" out of  
which it is made, the kinds of relationships that are important, and the 
forces that might produce or modify those relationships. In effect, a 
paradigm is a framework for the construction of an empirical theory and 
the choice of a paradigm is the choice of the language in which the 
theory w i l l  be bu ilt  and the research carried out. Although research 
based on one paradigm may be useful to work in another, a l l  but the 
barest facts (and sometimes those as well , depending on operational 
definitions of concepts) require translation. For example, Fiorina 
(1981) can make frequent use of the party identification variable from 
the Michigan surveys in his basically rationalistic account of American 
electoral choice, even citing figures computed by those using other 
approaches. His theoretical definition of party identification, how­





























































































Paradigms are not fa l s i f i a b le .  They provide structures within 
which f a ls i f i a b le  empirical hypotheses may be formulated but have no 
empirical content themselves. Rather, a paradigm is judged by its  
usefulness, that is by whether the theories advanced within it  are 
verified and whether it contributes to understanding. Ultimately, the 
test of a theory, and thus indirectly the measure of its parent para­
digm's usefulness, is the "objective" standard of accuracy. To date, 
however, no social science theory has achieved a level of accuracy such 
that it can stand on that ground alone. Thus, "generality, plausibility 
and auxilliary implications" must remain important bases for judging 
theories and choosing paradigms (Fiorina, 1981: 190).
Unfortunately, one implication of this is that the choice of para­
digms is largely a matter of taste based on intuition. Moreover, the 
paradigm that appears most useful for studying one class of phenomena 
may be different from that which appears most useful for another 
(Kaplan, 1964: 258-326). It is not surprising, then, that there has 
been no consensus reached within political science, or even within its 
subfields. I f  cumulative progress is to be made, however, this problem 
must be resolved.
This paper is not the place to debate the relative merits of a l l  
the competing paradigms in po l it ica l  science, a task which has been 
undertaken elsewhere (Barry, 1970; Holt and Richardson, 1970). Instead, 
in this section I only want to lay out the basic elements of the para­





























































































The basic unit for the rationalistic approach is the goal-oriented 
rational actor. Goal-oriented actors are individuals who perceive that 
they have goals and whose actions are motivated by a desire to achieve 
those goals. People do not just act, they act so as to bring about a 
situation that they value more rather than one that they value less; i f  
there is behavior that cannot be regarded as purposive, it is inexplica­
ble within the rat ional ist ic  framework. Rationality implies that in 
attempting to further their goals, actors always try to maximise their 
attainment with the minimum expenditure of resources. As Locke (1975, 
section 131) put it, "no rational creature can be supposed to change his 
condition with an intention to be worse."
Stopping here, one would not have said much, for it seems apparent 
that all behavior is rational. Indeed, i f  a psychotic's withdrawal from 
rea l ity  lessens his pain, even that would be rational (Kelley, 1957). 
Unless the goals being pursued are known or assumed, the rationalist can 
do l i t t l e  beyond vacuous or jex post explanations of the form "He did 
what he did because he wanted to." Rationalistic work advances beyond 
this by specifying the ends to be pursued, but at this point one 
advances from the level of paradigm to that of specific theories. The 
problem of what goals to consider with specific reference to a theory of 
party government is discussed below.
It is important to be clear as to what this notion of a goal-  
oriented rational actor does not imply. Firstly, it  does not imply that 
an individual's goals will be mutually compatible in the sense of being 
achievable simultaneously. There may be trade-offs  necessary in any 




























































































both low taxes and a high level of public expenditure for education. 
Indeed, the basic assumption of the most rat ional is t ic  of th,e social 
sciences, economics, is that people simultaneously desire both guns and 
butter in incompatible quantities. (See, however, Converse, 196M: 209.) 
Secondly, it does not imply that an individual's goals are sensible as 
seen by an outside observer. Some goals are simply matters of taste; 
that I consider something to be objectionable, immoral, or s e l f ­
destructive does not preclude its pursuit by someone else. Other goals 
are instrumental and thus based on reality judgments. In this case, an 
objective observer might decide that they were foolish or mistaken, but 
this raises the third point. Rational actors are not assumed to be 
omniscient; indeed the costs of obtaining reliable information may be 
such that a rational individual would consider a blind guess to be more 
cost effective than an informed judgment. Fourthly, rational actors 
need not make involved cost-benefit analyses before taking every action. 
Rules of thumb and standard operating procedures are rational i f  they 
have been proven satisfactory by experience, either real or vicarious. 
The search for an optimal strategy may prove suboptimal i f  excessive 
search and decision costs are incurred. What is assumed is that indi­
viduals behave as _if they made cost-benefit analyses based on the goals 
they choose to pursue, with the resources available to them, and in the 
circumstances in which they find themselves.2
The rat ional ist ic  paradigm is self-consciously individualistic.  
Neither groups nor organisations exist as primary units within its  
framework. Instead, they are viewed fundamentally as collections of 
individuals whose cooperation or cohesion must be explained (Olson, 




























































































phenomena rather than individual actors; organisation is a strategy that 
may be pursued by some sets of individuals.
This does not mean that organisations or social groups may not 
enter rationalistic theories for analytic simplicity. Theory building 
and testing within the rat iona l is t ic  paradigm proceeds by successive 
approximations. Simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of the 
actors, the goals they pursue, the environment in which they operate, or 
the strategies open to them are posited, and, on the basis of the 
consequent model, hypotheses are deduced concerning their behavior. 
These are tested and to the extent that predictions fail  to f it  reality 
the model is modified. In considering the interactions among 
organisations, it may be productive initia lly to regard them as unitary 
actors. Downs' (1957) treatment of parties is a classic example of 
this. Although many suggestive conclusions could be derived from this 
simplification, many anomolies remained. Others (e.g., Robertson, 1976) 
later relaxed this assumption, obtaining a closer f it  with reality.
Organisations and institutions may also play a role in rational  
theories as exogenous or situational variables. From the point of view 
of the individual(s) whose behavior is to be explained, an organisation 
may appear to be a fixed structure like any other institution. Behavior 
is decided on and takes place within an institutional structure. Since 
this partia l ly  determines the results of any particular pattern of  
behavior, it  influences the likelihood that such behavior w i l l  occur. 
For example, behavior on the part of a candidate that would be rewarded 
in a proportional representation system might be counterproductive, and 




























































































condition the expected responses from others and anticipation of those 
responses will influence the actor's initial choice of behavior. Social 
and economic variables may be considered in the same way.
Social structure may also be relevant to a rat ional ist ic  theory 
through i t s  influence on the goals  of ind iv idua ls .  While the 
rat ional ist ic  paradigm does not recognise social classes as entities  
distinct from the individuals who comprise them, commonality of sociali­
zing experiences and similarity of objective situations may lead members 
of a social class to have similar interests and goals. Moreover, among 
the values inculcated by these experiences may be a subjective 
identification and consequent desire for group solidarity and conformity 
to perceived group norms. Again, however, class so l idarity  and class 
consciousness are seen not as natural but as needing explanation. 
Similarly, while "working class Tories" may be exceptional in some 
countries, the ra t iona l is t ic  paradigm does not regard them as 
theoretical anomolies.
The rationalistic paradigm is a way of looking at the world and a 
style of explanation. In this view, whatever the ultimate influence 
exercised by social forces or institutional/organisational arrangements, 
the immediate cause of a political event is always the conscious choice 
of individual human beings. While social, economic, cultural, or poli­
t ica l  differences may lead individuals who are otherwise similarly  
placed and pursuing the same goals to make different choices, it is only 






























































































The consequences of adopting a rat ional is t ic  approach begin to 
appear as soon as we think about parties. In general terms, there are 
two different ways in which parties may be viewed. The one most common 
among adherents of the various "sociological" approaches, and the one 
often implicit in analyses of the functions of political parties or in 
assertions that parties do, or ought to do, certain things, as well as 
in comparisons of the behavior or "gestalt" of dif ferent types of 
parties, is to see each party as an organic entity. In this view, 
parties seek to control the government and, in this attempt, may either 
conflict or cooperate with other organisations or structures in society 
such as mass media, bureaucracy, interest groups, business firms, and 
the military.
From the rationalistic perspective, however, party must be seen as 
a "they" rather than as an "it . "  Moreover, once one tr ies  to develop a 
rigorous theory or to operationalise the concepts necessary for empi­
rical research, the corporate view of party leads to great difficulties.  
Two may be mentioned here. The first concerns the coherence of party. 
I f  party is to be regarded as a whole, it  ought to be possible, for 
example, to identify its goals. As constant conflict and debate within 
the British Labour party makes clear, however, it is not always a simple 
task to identify a party's authoritative voice so as to identify its  
goals. Similarly, in factionalised parties the decision of constitu­
tionally authorised party organs may not bind the party's constituent 



























































































party as a microcosmic political system simply underline the inadequacy 
of the original conceptualisation.
This is underscored by the second problem which is in many ways 
even more d i f f icu lt .  The corporate view must assume parties to have 
d i s t in c t  boundaries that set them apart from other structures 
(Eldersveld, 1964: 1). In fact, there is obviously a deep interpene­
tration of these supposedly rival and autonomous power sources. What, 
for example, is one to make of the situation in which a church or trade 
union controls policy by creating a "captive" political party to do its 
bidding? Although the British Labour party has grown more autonomous 
than it was originally, the trade unions s t i l l  dominate its conference. 
Is it a separate institution or an arm of the trade union movement? If  
the bishops dictate policy to a Christian democratic party, is the 
church simply a successful pressure group, or is the party an arm of the 
church? And what of the converse case, when a party creates ancillary 
organisations that behave like other interest groups? Is the Italian 
CGIL the Communist party in another form or an autonomous and 
potentially r iva l  group? In either case, total autonomy and total 
subservience are both overstatements; there are both connections and 
differences. This reality is easily lost in viewing party as a distinct 
organism.
The alternative view is to deny the independent existential basis 
of party, as well as of other groups. Instead, party is seen as an 
organisation of, or structured pattern of interactions among, indivi­
duals in pursuit of their own goals. Rather than being an independent 
actor, party is an instrument or conduit or basis of influence used by 




























































































performed within or through po l i t ica l  parties rather than by them. 
Especially, one is alerted to the poss ib i l ity  that "party functions" 
might be performed elsewhere or not at a l l ,  even while organisations 
calling themselves parties exist.
This highlights a clear problem with functional definitions of 
parties. I f  parties are defined by their functions, party nonfeasance 
becomes a logical impossibility. Likewise, it becomes impossible for 
the defining functions of parties to be performed by any other institu­
tion since it would thereby become a party. One may, of course, s t i l l  
refer to the functions of political parties in the sense of "things done 
by individuals through the mechanism of party" and be concerned with the 
importance of those things and of having them done by parties for the 
political system.1* As Smith (1982) observes, however, "It is one thing 
to provide a functional 'check-list,' but quite another to imply that a 
party, a party system or an arrangement of party government exists in 
order to 'perform' certain functions. The approach readily lends itse l f  
to distortion. It implies some kind of over-arching system rationality 
without ever being called upon to demonstrate its presence....Without 
necessarily committing i t s e l f ,  the functional ordering additionally  
takes on a static emphasis, tending to look for a fixed relationship  
between structure and function." While the rat ional is t ic  approach 
assumes that individual actors are rational,  i t  makes no assumptions 
about the "rationality of the system," and indeed research has shown 
that individual rationality may lead to collective i r ra t iona l i ty  
(Hardin, 1968).



























































































from other structured patterns of interaction? The answer lies in the 
functions of po lit ical  parties, not for the po lit ica l  system as in a 
functional analysis, but for those who use them. Polit ica l  parties  
developed in the nineteenth century with the rise of mass suffrage and 
regularised political participation. They were created to support and 
assist their organisers who were already in government (in the case of 
parties of intraparliamentary origin) or who wished to get into 
government (parties of extraparliamentary or ig in ) .5 They replaced 
combinations of members of parliament who supported or opposed the 
government of the day on the basis of their personal interests or 
preferences, the interests or preferences of their sponsors, or in 
return for particularist ic  rewards. Party represents a strategy by 
which support in the mass public may be curried and converted into 
political power in an electorally oriented democratic society. The key 
change was ultimate dependence on popular election, and the central 
distinction between parties and other groups is that they contest 
elections and rely on their success in elections for their claim to 
legitimate participation in government.
Left at this, personal campaign organisations would qualify as 
p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ie s ,  and to a l im ited extent and e sp e c ia l ly  in 
presidential systems they do. Presidential systems require special 
treatment because personal and party victory in a presidential election 
are synonymous; whichever person/party wins that one election wins 
control of the executive branch of government.^ In parliamentary 
systems — and in the legislative branch of presidential systems — the 
real prize comes not from a single candidate's victory, but from the 




























































































distinguished by their cooperative seeking of majorities, and the_ 
concomitant right and obligation collectively to govern and to be held 
responsible for governing.
Fundamentally, parties represent to the voters alternative teams of 
rulers and to the members of those teams a device for mobilising support 
to compete with the members of other teams. The basis of this competi­
tion may be programmatic or ideological,  but i t  need not be. In par­
ticular, conservative parties may have no concrete program, only a broad 
philosophy and a be l ie f  in their own ab i l i ty  to rule in the national 
interest (Beer, 1969: 99; Amery, 1953: 4-31). Other parties may have no 
articulated goal beyond supporting a particular leader. The party 
politician is committed, or acts as i f  he were committed, to a coopera­
tive quest for power, not just a personal quest for o f f ice ,  while the 
party voter is voting for a team in addition to a particular candidate.
This conception of party has obvious roots in the responsible 
parties doctrine. In that notion, parties are the link between the 
public as a whole and the government as a whole. For parties to serve 
this function, voters must be able to treat them as collective entities. 
Only i f  parties behave cohesively in the discharge of public office, and 
only i f  their candidates are prepared to stand or fa ll  as a team on the 
basis of the party's collective record in office and proposals for the 
future can voters, whose electoral vocabulary is necessarily limited, 
have a chance to speak ef fect ive ly  (Lowell, 1913: 67-69; Schatt- 
schneider, 1942: 52). Party is defined here with at least an eye toward 
this theory.




























































































questions. The first concerns the nature of party unity and indirectly 
the question of internal party "democracy" in the case of parties with 
mass memberships. The "party democrats" have seen parties as "huge 
associations of partisan voters," and have insisted that they be 
internally democratic (Schattschneider, 1942: 54; Kirkpatrick, 1950: 22- 
23). This has naturally raised some complaints that internal party 
competition is incompatible with collective action in government. While 
this point may be valid empirically, it  is theoretically possible to 
argue that internal party democracy requires not only that there be 
competition within the party but also that all  party people, including 
the losers of this internal competition, behave cohesively vis-a-vis the 
external world in support of the victorious position. It is only this 
point that is required by partyness. Whatever the internal organisation 
or rules of the party, and whatever the level of consensus or dissensus 
among party people, in their relations with nonparty individuals and 
groups, those following a party strategy of political action must behave 
as a team.
The second question concerns the nature of the competition among 
those teams. The responsible parties theory of democracy generally is 
associated with the requirement that parties present clear and 
distinctive platforms, spelling out the policies they w i l l  follow in 
off ice .  Because the party that wins an election (assuming a single  
party does achieve a majority) can be trusted to put its manifesto into 
practice, this allows voters to exercise prospective control over 
policy. Parties might, however, compete on the basis of their records 
in o f f ice ,  in which case the control exercised by voters would be 




























































































(Fiorina, 1981: chap. 1). Indeed in the last  case, the choice of the 
voters — and correspondingly the competition among the parties — may 
be based on confidence in a particular team of leaders without necessary 
regard for the policies they have pursued in the past or would pursue in 
the future. While these differences are important, they do not bear on 
a party's claim to that name. All that is required is collective  
accountability, made possible by the expectation of collective action in 
off ice .
The third question concerns party membership. Who is the party? 
Most broadly, one could argue that a party consists of everyone who 
votes for or sympathises with it. Demands for internal democracy based 
on an institution like the American direct primary implic it ly  assume 
this view. Except for reaching an electoral decision, i t  is hard to 
imagine such an "organisation” taking any sort of collective action; 
"members" make no promises of loyalty and may not have even to admit 
their membership publicly; there can be no regular communication among 
members, only from leaders to followers; no sanctions can be imposed 
against deviants. A more restricted view would be to look only at 
formal members in the European card-carrying sense, but this implies a 
mass membership party. Even this, however, confuses supporters with 
participants. Although the individualistic orientation renders the 
whole problem of only marginal concern, the view taken here is that the 
leadership is the party, and when party is discussed as an actor, it is 
to the collective leadership that reference is meant. This is the only 
group small enough and in suffic iently  constant communication that 




























































































importance of mass membership in some parties, and of the decisions of 
supporters for all parties. Members may take many policy decisions —  
although always subject to the interpretation of party leaders. They 
may also choose the leaders. Nonetheless, they are no more "the party" 
than citizens are "the government" in representative democracies. 
Finally, as suggested above, mass membership is not necessary for a 
party at a l l .
The three requirements or defining characteristics of "partyness" 
thus are: Dcohesive team behavior; 2)orientation toward winning control 
over the totality of political power exercised by elected officials and 
those appointed by elected officials; and 3) claiming legitimacy on the 
basis of electoral success. Organisations with many different structural 
forms could satisfy these criteria and properly be called parties. On 
the other hand, organisations that ca l l  themselves parties might not. 
For example, clandestine groups that do not contest elections — even i f  
only because they are legally barred from doing so — would not qualify 
as political parties as the term is meant here.? More generally, since 
organisations can vary in the degree to which they satisfy each of these 
requirements, this implies that"partyness" ought to be regarded as a 
variable with a range of values, i f  not necessarily as a continuum, 
rather than as a dichotomy. In these terms, the British Conservative 
party is more party-like than the Italian Christian Democracy, while 
both are more party-like than the American Republicans, who are in turn 
more party-like than the American Prohibition party.
Party Government




























































































between a dichotomy and a range. There has been some tendency to regard 
party government as a category into which a system either does or does 
not f i t .  For example, Mintzel and Schmitt (1981a; see also 1982b) say 
"Party government is that form of societal conflict regulation in which 
a p lura l ity  of democratically organised po lit ical  parties play a 
re lat ive ly  dominant role both in the socio-political mediation sphere 
and in the actual process of po l i t ica l  decision-making (government 
sphere)." Similarly, Sjttblom (1981) suggests with a Venn diagram that 
party government is a class, although he also proposes nested subclasses 
that might be taken as successively closer approximations of an ideal 
type.
I f  one is interested in the causes, consequences, and future of 
party government, however, this approach is of l i t t l e  help. Leaving 
aside Mintzel and Schmitt's questionable insistence on democratically 
organised parties, presumably a reference to their internal arrangements 
rather than to their commitment to democracy in the wider governmental 
sphere, i f  party government is a category, it  evidently includes a l l  
modern Western democracies with the possible exception of the United 
States. I f  this is so, then the concept is of no empirical value, since 
the corresponding operational variable will  have no variance. Moreover, 
i f  party government means government through parties and partyness can 
vary, then party governmentness must be able to take on a range of 
values as well.
Party government is an abstraction of European parliamentary 
democracy in the era of mass suffrage. Although most clearly based on 
academic interpretations of British practice, the party government model 




























































































the actual operation of any real party governments. In historical  
terms, the party government model represents the adaptation of the 
institutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy (which were 
adaptations of the institutions of royal government) to democracies with 
electorates numbering in the millions rather than the thousands. For 
democratic theory, the party government model makes government 
accountable to the general public by entrusting it  to individuals 
organised into part ies  that owe the ir  posit ions to e le c to ra l  
approbation. More concretely, party government involves at least four 
conditions.
Firstly, all  major governmental decisions must be taken by people 
chosen in elections conducted along party l ines, or by individuals 
appointed by and responsible to such people. It is not necessary that 
parties compete on the basis of alternative policy proposals, but 
whatever policies are made must be made by individuals who owe their 
authority either directly or indirectly to the electoral success of 
their parties. Recognising that a permanent bureaucracy is an essential 
feature of a l l  modern governments, this condition is violated to the 
extent that bureaucrats exercise independent policy making authority. 
It is similarly violated whenever rule making power is turned over to 
individuals who cannot be removed by elected officials® or to functional 
boards whose members owe their positions to their roles in interest  
groups or the like rather than to party appointment or election.
Secondly, policy must be decided within the governing party, when 
there is a "monocolor" government, or by negotiation among parties when 




























































































officials, a condition met for example by the American Congress, it must 
also be made-along party lines, 'so that each party may be held 
collectively accountable for "its" position. This condition is not met 
by the Congress. Similarly, cross-party negotiations among factions, as 
occurs in Italy, also violates this condition.
Thirdly, the highest o f f i c i a l s  (e.g., cabinet ministers and 
especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and 
be responsible to the people through their parties. Positions in 
government must flow from support within the party rather than party 
positions flowing from electoral success. For example, the British  
practice whereby the leader of the majority party in the House of  
Commons becomes prime minister is consistent with the party government 
model while the American usage of declaring the winner of enough primary 
elections to be nominated for president, or of enough popular votes to 
be elected president, therefore to be the leader of his party is not. 
That British party leaders often remain as leaders even after their 
parties are defeated but are unlikely to survive a substantial 
intraparty defection even i f  they formally win the "vote of confidence," 
while a presidential candidate's "party leadership" can withstand major 
internal defections but not electoral defeat, is indicative of this 
distinction. The French case is more complicated, but closer to the 
party government model than to the American model. Mitterand became the 
presidential candidate of the Socialist party because he was the party's 
leader (although clearly his presidential appeal was a condition for his 
rise to party leadership); he remained party leader even after his 
defeat in the 197M election. Giscard was similarly party leader first  




























































































he was president, however, was more in the American mold.
Fourthly, party-based leaders must be able effectively to control 
the bureaucracy and other public or semi-public agencies. Party 
domination of the elected branches of government must carry with it  
control over the entire governmental apparatus. Although bureaucrats 
are never politically irrelevant, the party must be able to coordinate 
and direct their work effectively.
A number of observations must be made regarding this definition of 
party government. Firstly, it represents an ideal type, rather like but 
in contrast to Dahl's (1971) ideal type of polyarchy. As such, it  
represents an extreme that may be approximated but is neither realised 
nor rea l isable  in the ultimate sense. It is also a multidimensional 
concept. Thus a particular system may closely approximate the ideal 
type in one respect but not in another. For example, while the 
partyness of American congressional-presidential relations is extremely 
low in comparison to its British parliamentary-cabinet counterpart, the 
partyness of the American bureaucracy is higher than that of the 
British. Similarly, even within a single political system the degree to 
which many dimensions of the ideal are approximated may vary from one 
policy area, time, or set of circumstances to another.
Secondly, party government is not a complete description of 
government or institutions. While perhaps more c learly  derived from 
consideration of adversarial or majoritarian systems in which elections 
choose between rival and alternating sets of leaders and policies, the 
basic logic of the model is equally applicable to consociational or 




























































































presidential and/or federal systems, party government is logica lly  
compatible with these institutional arrangements as well as with 
parliamentary and unitary systems.
Together, these two observations imply that many dif ferent  
approximations of the party government model are possible. Assuming 
that a single quantitative measure of party government were devised, it 
would combine several dimensions with the result that two systems could 
achieve the same "party government score" while standing quite 
differently on the individual dimensions. Whether the dimensions that 
comprise the overall concept of party government are su f f ic ient ly  
coherent that this does not occur, or whether the dimensions of the 
overall concept must be considered separately, is a question for 
empirical research.
In the same way, similar "party government scores" might be 
achieved by countries with very d if ferent party systems. Two party 
competitive systems, systems with alternating coalitions, systems 
dominated by a single party or coalition with a semipermanent opposition 
(so long as it  is permitted to contest elections free ly ) ,  and systems 
with grand coalitions a l l  are potential party governments. Whether 
similar levels of party government are produced by similar conditions 
and whether they lead to similar consequences in these differing systems 
also must be resolved empirically.
Finally, this definition of party government is intended to distin­
guish party government from other forms of government. It  speaks, 
therefore, to the "partyness of government" as a characteristic of 
formal institutions and indicates the proportion of formal governmental 




























































































extent that its conditions are met, what formal government there is will  
be party government. There is no guarantee, however, that there will  be 
any effective formal government at all. While the "authoritative allo­
cation of values" goes on in all  societies — even those with no "polit­
ical" institutions — the government of the party government model may 
be more or less relevant to this process.
This observation has two consequences for the definition of party 
government. First ly ,  it  means that those conditions which define or 
promote government in general must be appended to those spec i f ica l ly  
relating to party government. Secondly, adding these considerations to 
the definition of party government underlines a distinction between 
partyness as a characteristic of the formal government apparatus and 
party governmentness as a social characteristic. For example, in a 
laissez-faire economy, high partyness of government would s t i l l  leave 
parties in a re lative ly  marginal position in the authoritative  
allocation of economic values. Correspondingly, i f  the power of 
government grew while the party politicians' relative ability to control 
it shrank, parties might become absolutely more important in the overall 
allocation of values even while the level of partyness of government 
declined. Party governmentness is then a characteristic of the 
"herrschaftsorganisation" of the wider society, and indicates the 
proportion of a ll social power exercised by parties within the framework 
of the party government model.
Capacity
Looking at the chronic economic problems of many western countries, 



























































































there is a strong temptation of attribute these difficulties to a lack 
of capacity on the part of the government or parties. There is an 
element of truth to this. Assuming that the governments of the 
contemporary west want to "solve” their economic problems, and assuming 
that the democratic regimes of Germany, Italy, and Spain "wanted" to 
survive, their failure to do so certainly indicates a lack of capacity. 
This, however, is a tautology, not an explanation; i f  fa i lure  is the 
definer of low capacity, low capacity cannot be the explanation of 
failure.
Moreover, in many cases it  is not clear that fa i lure  as defined 
from outside really is an indicator of low capacity. To listen to the 
rhetoric of some le f t  wing politicians, one might wonder whether 
bourgeois parties really do want to reduce unemployment; after all ,  it 
keeps wages low and workers docile. Similarly, inflation is beneficial 
to some groups, at least in the short run. Beyond the debatability of 
what a solution to many problems is, the cost of a solution in terms of 
personal or organisational goals may be so high that politicians choose 
not to solve the problem. In Thurow's ( 1980: 44) view, for example, 
Richard Nixon could have stemmed American inflation in 1972 had he 
persisted with recessionary policies; he believed that to do so, 
however, would cost him the 1972 election and so he chose to change his 
policy. Objective failure thus may be the result of lack of w i l l  or 
lack of foresight rather than lack of ability. Finally, some problems 
may have no solutions. I f  poverty is relative rather than absolute, 
then the poor will always be with us.
This suggests that "problem solution capacity" actually consists of 




























































































capacity to get a specific policy implemented. Taking an example from 
the f ie ld  of economic management, i f  the party leadership decides it  
wants the central bank's loan rate raised, does it  have the ab i l ity  to 
get that done. More generally, this element also includes the ability  
to implement one policy without unintentionally disrupting the 
implementation of other policies.
The second element of poblem solution capacity is the ab i l i ty  to 
frame policies that w i l l  produce the desired (by the policy maker) 
results. Conceptually, this and the first element are confused by the 
fact that many political ends are means to more fundamental ends, which 
in turn are means, and so forth. Continuing with the economic example, 
an increase in the bank rate may be a means to reduce the money supply, 
which is a means to reduce inflation, which is a means to stem capital 
f l igh t ,  which is a means to stimulate investment, etc. I f  the party 
chooses to reduce the money supply and nothing happens, does this mean 
that they lacked the capacity to implement a policy or that they lacked 
the capacity to choose a policy that would produce the desired result? 
Empirically, however, i t  is often possible to distinguish perceived 
means from perceived ends, and to find circumstances in which a party's 
orders are scrupulously followed without the desired result being 
achieved.
The third element of problem solution capacity is the ab i l i ty  to 
choose the "right" aims or policies. This is the most difficult element 
to deal with because of the ambiguity and unmeasurability of "right."  
On one hand, the term is often used as a synomym for the policies the 




























































































of party government. On the other hand, concern with the "right"  
policies simply pushes the means-ends chain even further along and takes 
a longer-term view. Can the party identify problems before they become 
crises? Can it choose policies that avert crises in the future? In the 
economic example, can the party find a balance among economic growth, 
inflation, unemployment, and conservation of resources that is viable in 
the long run?1®
The final element of problem solution capacity is will. Given that 
a party could identify correct long term goals, could formulate policies 
that would achieve those goa ls ,  and could get those p o l i c i e s  
implemented, does it  do so? Is the party so positioned and so 
structured that its leaders are prepared to expend the resources and 
bear the costs involved in formulating and implementing policies?
The economic examples suggest that capacity involves the power to 
alter social reality, for example to solve the problem of inflation by 
reducing the inflation rate. There is another sense of capacity that 
must be remembered, the ab i l ity  to resolve or defuse problems by 
altering perceptions rather than situations, in this case to get people 
to see a higher inflation rate as acceptable or to lower their level of 
concern. The same elements are relevant to this sense of capacity as 
well.
Survivability
There are three ways to conceive of the survivability of a system 
of party government. The first concerns the durability of the current 
party system and especially the continued dominance of those parties  
most regularly in off ice .  On the surface, this may be the least  




























































































Even i f  the party labels remain the same and there is continuity of 
organisation, the issues raised by the parties, the social groups allied 
with each party, and the party leaders will all change. Realignments, 
the rise of new parties and the collapse of old parties a l l  may occur 
without causing more than cosmetic changes to the society's system of 
governance. On the other hand, the survival of the current party system 
is l ike ly  to be of great importance to those owing their positions to 
it.
The second aspect of survivability of party government relates to 
the continued adherence of political actors to the party government 
strategy. The alternative would be a voluntary abandonment of this 
strategy and thus the supersession of party government by some other 
form11. This could come about i f  the combination of goals and 
circumstances that led originally to the establishment of party 
government were to change. For example, exogenous changes such as the 
rise of television or strengthened interest group systems might 
encourage even those who have gained power through party to adopt other 
strategies and certainly would alter the attractiveness of alternative 
avenues of influence for succeeding generations of political activists. 
The long run effect would be to change the balance of political forces 
to the detriment of party government. Moreover, the interplay of short 
term and long term goals could lead those in power under a party 
government model to make choices that ultimately undermine that very 
system from within. The creation of nonparty independent boards such as 





























































































Supersession, as these examples suggest, would be an evolutionary 
process resulting from gradual changes and the interplay of many 
individual decisions over a period of time. Since party government is 
more a matter of interrelationships among individuals than i t  is of 
institutions, it  is l ike ly  that many of the structures of party 
government — cabinets, partisan elections, and the parties themselves 
— would survive a process of supersession, just as the "dignified"  
parts of the 19th century English constitution had survived their 
supersession by the "e f f ic ient"  parts (Bagehot, 1963). Indeed, the 
persistence of the old institutions might aid in legitimising the new 
regime. The actual level of party government would decline over time 
until ultimately one discovered that it  had gone. While we have no 
examples of party governments being fully superseded by some other form, 
one can look for examples of decline in party government.
The third aspect of survivabil ity is avoidance of precipitate  
collapse or what Smith calls rupture. In this case, the institutions of 
the old party government regime disappear. The agents of the collapse 
may be external, as in a coup or revolution, or they may be internal,  
with those currently in office deciding to restructure the government 
themselves. Presumably, rupture could in the abrupt replacement of one 
variety of party government by another, as the replacement of the Fourth 
French Republic by the Fifth ultimately did. It is clear, however, that 
De Gaulle's intention was to establish a democratic, but nonparty 
government, regime. The early Fifth Republic in fact would be scored 





























































































Much of the concern for the future of party government stems from 
the close connection of this model with ideas about democracy. Indeed, 
representative democracy has been defined by some in such a way as to 
make party government logically necessary for its attainment. This is 
not the place for a full consideration of the meaning of democracy, but 
since the question of whether party government is a necessary condition 
for democratic or nonauthoritarian government in mass societies so 
colours discussion of its future, this question must be addressed.
The party government model presumes a re lative ly  centralised 
decision-making process in which a single agency, be it a parliament, a 
president, or a cabinet exercises supreme control over the full range of 
government activities. The problem is to democratise that government. 
In the party government conception, the fundamental democratic principle 
is majority rule. Because a majority has given their votes to the party 
or coalition of parties in power and can be said collectively to control 
them, either prospectively or retrospectively, those politic ians are 
entitled to exercise a l l  the power of the state. Thus, where formal 
institutions are not centralised in this way, the model assigns to 
parties the function of making them operate in practice as i f  they were 
so organised.
The party government model implicitly assumes the possibility of 
forming majority coalitions, either within a single party or among a 
limited number of parties, that are able to agree on a wide range of 
issues. In its simplest form, the party government model must assume 
not only that there are two sides to every question (Duverger, 1959), 
but that there are exactly two significant complexes of positions each 




























































































guaranteed a majority. Variations based on coalitions relax this 
assumption, but the notion that political conflict should be contained 
in the competition of relatively few, cohesive, parties s t i l l  carries 
with i t  the expectation that society w i l l  be similarly  divided into 
re la t ive ly  few cohesive groups, each with its own complex of policy 
positions or interests. The archetypical example of this is working 
class solidarity in the socialist tradition of class based politics, but 
farmers' parties, or parties of religious subcultures could be equally 
consistent with it.
Laid out like this, it is clear that there are alternative concep­
tions of democracy imaginable. Two may be mentioned as examples. One is 
a kind of neocorporatism exemplified by Heisler 's (1974) "European 
polity model." In contrast to the party government model's assumption 
of centralised decision-making, this model envisions functionally seg­
mented authority. The fundamental value is compromise and the achieve­
ment of consensual decisions among those most d irectly  affected by a 
particular policy, rather than decision by a majority of a ll citizens. 
The people are represented in the decision-making bodies of this system, 
but not primarily in their capacity as citizens. Instead, the emphasis 
is on representation of affected interests. In Heisler's model, func­
tional boards coexist with a parliamentary system, but as the corpo- 
ra t is t  bodies gain in influence, the model quite naturally begins to 
assign primacy to interest groups rather than to parties as avenues of 
popular participation in the governing process.
The other alternative is p lura l ist  democracy as elaborated by 




























































































States. Emphasis is shifted from majority rule to the protection of 
minorities. This is achieved in part through the incoherence of the 
parties. Instead of each party representing a distinctive social or 
ideological constituency, the parties overlap so that no party can 
afford to offend any group. In place of stable majorities, shifting  
coalitions that often cut across party lines decide succeeding issues. 
In terms of social structure, this model assumes cross-cutting cleavages 
rather than coherent groups.
Whether these, or other possible systems, would have the necessary 
capacity to resolve social problems, whether they could survive, and 
whether they could remain nonauthoritarian are open questions, but the 
same is true of party government.
Relationships and Hypotheses
As laid out above, party government is less a category than it is a 
strategy which might be pursued within the category of democratic gov­
ernment. Consequently, the first questions that must be addressed are: 
1) under what circumstances would individuals seeking control of gov­
ernment adopt the party government strategy? and 2) what conditions 
relate to their likelihood of success? A second set of questions then 
relates the level of party government to the concepts of capacity and 
survivability: 3) what are the conditions for capacity and survivabil­
ity? and 4) does the model of party government have any built-in charac­
teristics that relate to capacity or survivability? Naturally, complete 
answers to these questions are impossible here. The purpose of this 




























































































to sketch several hypotheses that might be tested in later research. 
Conditions for Party Government
Po l it ica l  parties were organised to mobilise mass support. They 
are not the only way in which mass support may be mobilised and chan­
neled. Interest groups, in fact, predate po l i t ica l  parties and were 
used to mobilise support to influence parliamentary and monarchic gov­
ernments. With increases in education and leisure time and with the 
growing complexity of societies, the number and range of interest groups 
has mushroomed. In corporatist or polyarchal models of government, 
these structures are far more important than are parties. Further, the 
mass media, especially television, increasingly are able to arouse the 
public, either on behalf of politicians, who thus no longer need rely 
on party as their primary channel of communication with the public, or 
on behalf of other interests, including their own. Moreover, important 
though it may be, mass support is not the only important po l i t ica l  
resource. As the complexity of the problems with which the government 
deals increases, so too does the value of technical expertise. As the 
need for voluntary compliance and cooperation increases, so too does the 
value of being able to secure or withhold that compliance. Po l it ica l  
parties may be able to mobilise these resources, but they may not. As a 
consequence, party is a political tool whose relative effectiveness and 
attractiveness to elites may vary.
To account for the behavior of po lit ic ians (and others) requires 
understanding of their goals so that the costs and benefits of various 
actions in terms of those goals may be assessed. The problem of goals 




























































































ascertained empirically. This appears most desirable, but actually 
involves several serious d i f f icu lt ie s .  To infer goals from behavior 
leads immediately to a problem of circularity; I f  behavior is the opera­
tional indicator of goals, then hypotheses explaining behavior on the 
basis of goals are nonfalsifiable. While direct questioning about goals 
avoids this problem, the practical problems of obtaining frank responses 
coupled with the impossibility of interviewing those who have passed 
from the scene render this strategy of questionable value as well.  
Public pronouncements such as speeches and party manifestos, while 
ostensible statements of goals, are prepared for strategic as well as 
informative purposes. Moreover, they frequently relate only to one 
variety of goal, those concerning public policy. Nonetheless, this kind 
of data, i f  interpreted with caution, does provide some insight into 
goals.
The other approach to goals is to stipulate them by assumption. 
The strategy then is to reason out what a rational actor pursuing the 
assumed goals would do, compare actual behavior to the deduced hypo­
theses, and to the degree that they coincide interpret this as evidence 
supporting both the general theory and the assumption about goals.
For professional politicians, the most common assumption has been 
that they "are interested in getting reelected — indeed, in their role 
here as abstractions, interested in nothing else" (Mayhew, 1974: 13). 
While an obvious oversimplification, this assumption has been defended 
on three grounds. The f i r s t  is the importance of the desire to be 
reelected as the mechanism on which democratic theory re l ie s  to make 
office holders accountable to the general public. Politicians with no 




























































































the needs or desires of their constituents. Secondly, whatever the 
other goals of po lit ic ians, reelection is an instrument to their 
realisation. To paraphrase one maxim, i f  winning isn't everything, 
losing isn't anything. Finally, the assumption that politicians are 
single minded seekers of reelection is defended on the ground that it  
works. A significant range of real world behavior can be explained in 
this way.
An alternative approach is to assume the primacy of policy commit­
ments over office. In this formulation, office has purely instrumental 
value; rational politicians will not compromise their beliefs to win or 
retain off ice  since doing so destroys the value of victory. There is 
certainly some truth to this position. Aside from the individual who 
has given up office for a principle, the continued existence of parties 
with no likelihood of ever participating in government or even winning a 
seat 1̂  and the fervor with which some parties espouse positions they 
know to be costly electorally imply that there must be some motivation 
beside o f f ice  seeking. At the same time, for every "p ro f i le  in
courage," there are corresponding "apologetic statesmen of a compro-
1 ?mising kind" prepared to endure anything in order to retain office. J
A more rea l is t ic  view of parties and politic ians requires that 
three types of goals be considered. The f i r s t  are policy goals. 
Clearly one reason why people engage in political activity is that they 
want to achieve or defeat certain social,  economic, or po l it ica l  
changes. Burke's very definition of party, "a body of men united, for 
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some 




























































































the importance of this motivation. While politicians and parties differ  
with regard to the specif ic ity of their policy goals, the degree to 
which they perceive them to be interconnected (ideological) or isolated, 
the range of compromise they are prepared to accept, and the overall  
importance they ascribe to policy, it would be difficult to find anyone 
engaged in political activity who was completely indifferent to policy. 
On the other hand, to assume that all members of a particular party must 
be agreed on anything but the vaguest of principles is to ignore the 
tremendous differences within such parties as the American Democrats, 
the Japanese Liberal Democrats, or the Italian Christian Democrats.
A second set of goals is organisational. Examples include main­
taining party unity, increasing the size of the party's membership, or 
securing some subsidy or competitive advantage. To the extent that 
party is purely instrumental, these goals are instrumental as well. The 
phenomenon of "party loyalty" and the agonising of politicians before 
they desert a party of which they have been long time members, however, 
suggest that party may become an end in itself,  a valued association to 
be defended even at the expense of other goals. Additionally, since the 
expected long term instrumental value of party may outweigh short term 
costs to other values, this category of goal must be considered.
Finally, there are personal goals. Politicians are people as well 
as public figures. While it  may make l i t t l e  sense to assume that 
parties as organisations seek office for its own sake, for an individual 
the social position, power, salary, or other perquisites that are part 
of public o f f ice  may be an ultimate, i f  rarely the ultimate, goal. 
Enough has been written about the corrupting influence of o f f ice  to 




























































































politicians, and those who aspire to become leading politicians.
Although this discussion has been in terms largely of professional 
politicians, the same types of goals may be ascribed to party members, 
supporters, and voters. Left wing policy demands that currently threaten 
the existence of the British Labour party are based largely in the rank 
and f i l e  and middle level e l ites .  The sacking of leading MPs for the 
crime of excessive loyalty to the leader indicates a feeling that 
electoral victory without ideological purity is not worth winning. At 
other times, constituency parties have behaved as though nothing were so 
important as party loyalty, even in the face of abrupt about turns in 
policy (Ranney, 1965: 281). Similarly, personal goals may be important 
at all levels of party. Some party members may be attracted primarily 
by a desire to contribute to party victory as a way of influencing 
policy for the public good or because they value victory by "their"  
party in the same way that they value victory by "their" football team, 
but others may be attracted by the hope of special treatment or 
patronage from the government, because a party job is preferable to 
unemployment or intrinsically attractive, or simply for a social outlet 
(Wilson, 1962). While my concern is primarily with party leaders, they 
must take account of the motivations of their followers i f  they are to 
be effective.
The interrelationships among these goals may be quite complex. Any 
of them may be instrumental for the achievement of others. Office or 
party organisation may be valued because they contribute to the oppor­
tunity to control policy, but policy may be manipulated so as to retain 




























































































tion may make the personal rewards of leadership more appealing and 
rea l isab le ,  but the achievement of high status may be used to bolster 
the party organisation. Conversely, no single strategy is likely to be 
best for achieving a l l  three types of goals simultaneously (Sjbblom, 
1968: 158-82). Compromises with other parties required to achieve 
office or to influence public policy may undermine the loyalty of party 
activists and thus weaken the party, as the Italian Communists recently 
have found, but ideological purity may be maintained only by remaining 
without o f f ice  or influence. The internal compromises required to 
maintain party unity or to advance one's personal career may involve 
sacrificing policy preferences.
Although under some circumstances rational individuals may decide 
that a party strategy is the best way to achieve their goals, that 
strategy will  certainly involve costs. Party involves compromise, co­
operation, and discipline, and those occasionally mean not doing what 
one otherwise would like to do. Although his limits of tolerance will 
vary according to the relative value placed on compensatory goals, 
unless the party is agreed total ly  on everything, a party politician  
occasionally will be compelled by party loyalty to support policies that 
personally he opposes. A party oriented voter occasionally will  have to 
vote for his party's candidate, even though he finds a candidate of 
another party to be more attractive personally. In a party government, 
bureaucrats occasionally w i l l  have to be silent and support policies  
that they think are ill-advised. The problem of explaining party gov­
ernment is to find combinations of circumstances and goals under which 
people will  be willing to bear these costs.




























































































circularity. The strongest conditioning factor for party government at 
the present is to have had party government in the past. Po lit ica l  
arrangements have a natural inertia. The role models for aspiring 
politicians, and thus the expectations on which they base their 
judgments, are the behavior patterns of their predecessors. Even when 
there are major structural changes, behavior is likely to adjust slowly. 
As Bagehot (1963: 268) observed about so momentous a change as the 
Reform Act of 1832, "A new Constitution does not produce its full effect 
as long as a l l  its subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as 
long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution." Change 
will be even slower without major upheavals.
Further, the defining characteristics of party government are 
conditioning factors for its continuance. I f  party dominates the policy 
making process, then those seeking to influence policy must work through 
parties. I f  the only route to office is through partisan election, then 
those seeking of f ice  must become party men. Moreover, many other 
factors that may provide incentives for party government-like behavior 
are themselves consequences of party government. Examples include party 
control over interest articulation and po lit ica l  communication, the 
existence of structural biases favoring partisan candidates over 
independents, or wide spread party identification in the mass public. 
Nonetheless, i f  some element of this apparently homeostatic pattern of 
mutual causation and reinforcement were to be modified by an exogenous 
force, one would expect changes throughout, and ultimately a change in 
the system's propensity toward party government. What factors ought one 




























































































Presidential or parliamentary government — Party government is
more l ike ly  in parliamentary systems because party is more useful to 
po lit ica l  leaders in such systems. A parliamentary cabinet needs a 
continuous majority to remain in office; even i f  a pattern of shifting 
alliances might allow a prime minister to remain in off ice  with a 
different majority on each vote, his ministry would be changing 
constantly. Party is a device by means of which stable majorities may 
be achieved, whether office is seen as an instrumental or as an ultimate 
value. Party is also useful for backbench MPs. For those interested in 
o f f ice ,  it  provides a career ladder; for those interested in policy, 
party provides a means of influencing the ministry, whose continuous 
dependence on party support forces them to take account of backbench 
opinion even i f  electoral expediency calls for another course.
Presidential government, on the other hand, both makes personalism 
more likely and entails two rival arenas for decision-making. While the 
latter  problem may be minimised by institutionalising executive 
dominance, as in Fifth Republic France, the former is thereby 
heightened. A president, with the resources of the state at his 
command, the status and v i s ib i l i t y  of head of state and head of 
government, and the security of a fixed term is l ike ly  to think of 
himself as separate from and independent of his party. Presidents, in 
seeing themselves personally to have been entrusted with administration 
of the state tend to appoint o f f i c ia l s  with weak or no party ties to a 
greater extent than do prime ministers. The officials so appointed owe 
their positions far more clearly to the president than to their parties. 
All this weakens party government (cf. Lijphart, 1977: 28-29, 210-16).




























































































party bias of presidential systems. The f i r s t  is frequent partisan 
reelection campaigns; the seven year term of the French president, for 
example, allows the incumbent so to overshadow his party that they are 
le ft  with l i t t le  alternative but to be subservient to him. The second 
is party control over nomination and renomination. Party government can 
coexist with a presidential system i f  only committed party men can 
become president or i f  party support is required for reelection. A 
system in which the president is chosen by a partisan electoral college 
like that of Finland would be more likely to have party government than 
one in which the president e ffect ive ly  is elected directly, as in the 
United States or France.
Integration and centralisation — The essence of party government 
is that what appears to the public as a single entity, the po l it ica l  
party, is in coordinated control of the entire government. While this 
is possible in a decentralised state, with a tightly centralised party 
organisation coordinating disparate branches of government, it is easier 
i f  the institutions of government are themselves centralised. Moreover, 
decentralised government also makes centralisation of the party more 
difficult to maintain (Eldersveld, 1964; Duverger, 1959: 55-56).
This is especially so i f  the basis of decentralisation is 
geographic. In this case, implementation of policies initiated at one 
level may depend on cooperation of o f f i c i a l s  at another level where 
government has a dif ferent partisan complexion. Responsibility is 
naturally obscured, and the parties have an incentive to obscure it  
further, those in control at each level attempting to claim credit for 




























































































other level for the rest. Moreover, i f  subnational governments are too 
powerful, the corresponding level of party organisation may supplant the 
national party as the primary focus of loyalty. I f  there are important 
regional differences in culture or interest, this can seriously  
undermine the coherence of the national parties and party system. The 
clearest examples of these problems are the distinction between 
presidential and congressional parties or between northern and southern 
Democrats in the United States (Burns, 1963) but Swiss parties show 
evidence of this as well (Katz, 1981; Kerr, 197*0.
Electoral system — Various aspects of the electoral system should 
have an impact on the level and nature of party government. Probably 
the most significant for party unity is the presence or absence of some 
form of intraparty electoral choice. In some systems, voters can choose 
only parties; the choice of the particular individuals who w i l l  be 
elected i f  their parties are victorious is an internal party decision. 
In other systems, however, voters either can influence or entirely  
determine the choice of person as well as of party (Katz, forthcoming). 
Where a candidate must compete with other candidates of his own party, 
support of and by the party is unlikely to be adequate for election. 
Instead, the candidate is forced to develop his own base of support. 
This undermines party cohesion in two ways. First ly, it  gives the 
successful candidate an independent base; not owing his election only to 
the party, he has less reason to be loyal to it. Secondly, in building 
support for the intraparty competition, the candidate w i l l  have made 
compromises, incurred debts, and developed loyalties different from 
those of his copartisans. Once in o ff ice ,  these candidates find party 




























































































involved questions of policy in addition to personalities (Katz, 1980).
Proportional representation (PR) should be more conducive to party 
government than are single member majority or p lura lity  systems. PR 
systems' l i s t  orientation forces candidates to campaign and voters to 
think in partisan rather than personal terms. It also encourages a 
uniform national party system by raising the local threshold for repre­
sentation (Rae, 1971) — thus discouraging purely local parties — while 
also encouraging parties that present candidates anywhere to present 
them everywhere. That candidates of a party in all areas of the country 
face the same multiple competitors should encourage them to take the 
same, ideological, positions, making party unity easier to maintain. On 
the other hand, PR also encourages party fragmentation by lowering the 
costs of party schisms. The insipient threat of schism may be mani­
fested in factionalism. In any case, fragmentation will make coalition 
government more likely.
Other things being equal, the more different kinds of elected 
o f f i c i a l s  there are, the weaker party government is l ike ly  to be. In 
particular, election of more than one o f f ic ia l  at the national level 
(e.g., a president and a prime minister) is l ike ly  to weaken party 
government by multiplying the number of individuals with personal claims 
to speak for the party. On the other hand, increasing the number of 
partisan appointed o f f ic i a l s  makes party government more l ike ly .  As 
government has grown larger and more complex, it  has required more 
people to control and coordinate it. Without adequate loyal personnel, 
a party government nominally in power has no defense against foot 



























































































governmental happenings. Similarly, policy making occurs at many 
points, requiring a large number of partisans in office i f  the party is 
to participate in the making of most policies, let alone i f  it  is to 
make them itself  (Rose, 1969).
Size of the public sector — While enlargement of the public sector 
may increase the party governmentness of society, it  is l ike ly  to 
decrease the partyness of government. First ly, a large public sector 
makes the ruling party more dependent on experts. Often these will be 
bureaucrats or representatives of affected interests rather than party 
people. Moreover, even those who are employees of the party are likely 
to have divided loyalties, on one hand to the party but on the other to 
their professional peer group. Secondly, the larger the sphere of  
government activity, the more d i f f i c u l t  w i l l  be the problem of 
c o o rd in a t io n  and the g re a t e r  the degree  o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
uncontrollability. Thirdly, expansion of government gives more groups a 
greater stake in politics, encouraging greater activity and involvement, 
but many of these groups are rivals for party. Fourthly, as more of the 
economy comes under public control, the need for stability, the party's 
desire to evade responsibility i f  things go wrong, and the party's fear 
of being totally excluded should they lose the next election all  grow. 
This has led to the creation of nonpartisan and multipartisan boards to 
control, for example, banking, nationalised industries, and mass commu­
nication. Once such boards are created, however, significant areas of 
policy leave direct party control and the problems of coordination of 
public policy increase.
Private  government — Ind iv idua ls  na tu ra l ly  try to avoid 




























































































responsibility that is the hallmark of party government is easier i f  the 
public is denied access to intraparty decision-making. Unable to attri­
bute blame to any particular individual or faction, the voters are 
encouraged to reward or punish the party as a whole. This, in turn, 
gives each member of the party a stake in the success of its  policies,  
even i f  he opposed them initially.
Private government also encourages party unity by making compromise 
among party leaders more possible. All parties are coalitions, and 
party leaders frequently owe their positions to the particular support 
of a subgroup within the party, be it  based on personal loyalt ies ,  
policy preferences, or organisational ties. Not faced with the need to 
forge agreement themselves, those supporters may not be sympathetic to 
the accommodations necessary to achieve unity, forcing the leader into 
the untenable position of alienating his supporters i f  he compromises, 
but losing his effectiveness i f  he does not.
Input, representation, and communication —  When party is the 
primary channel for public participation, demand articulation and 
aggregation, and communication from leaders to followers, party 
government will  be stronger. Where other structures, e.g., mass media 
and interest groups, share in performing these functions, party control 
over p o l i t i c s  w i l l  be weaker. In p a r t i c u la r ,  i f  the party is  
suff ic ient ly  in control of communication efectively to control the 
po l i t ica l  agenda, party government w i l l  be stronger. I f  nonparty 
agencies are able to set public priorities, however, the position of the 




























































































Bureaucratic anonymity — Bureaucrats are both potential rivals for
party politic ians and potential scapegoats for their failures. Both 
these poss ib i l i t ie s  undermine party government, but both can be 
minimised by an expectation of bureaucratic anonymity. Party government 
is furthered when politicians cannot avoid responsibility by blaming 
policies on the bureaucracy and bureaucrats are more likely to implement 
policies they personally oppose i f  they know they w i l l  not suffer for 
good faith ef forts  to implement bad policies. Moreover, party 
government is undermined whenever bureaucrats can appeal around their 
political masters directly to the public or to a powerful interest group 
clientele.
Social segmentation — Where each party represents a c learly  
discernable interest, segment, class, or viewpoint within society, party 
unity will be easier to maintain, the distinction between parties will  
be clearer, and party government w i l l  be more likely. Cross-cutting 
cleavages and overlapping party constituencies w i l l  make interparty 
cooperation, and intraparty dissension, more likely, thus decreasing the 
level of party government.
Where society is divided into relatively few groups, each of which 
has a re lat ive ly  coherent set of views spanning the range of public 
issues, a relatively small number of parties should be able adequately 
to represent those views. Cross-cutting cleavages force the leaders of 
each party to ignore many issues, consideration of which would threaten 
their party's unity. One consequence of this is likely to be increased 



























































































As the last several conditions mentioned indicate, party government 
depends not only on party politicians but also on the behavior of actors 
for whom the pattern of goals and structure of incentives may be quite 
different. While a full treatment of this problem is beyond the scope 
of a single paper, three potentially r ival power wielders should be 
discussed briefly, both for illustrative purposes and because of their 
importance.
Bureaucracy — The first of these is the bureaucracy. Especially 
in Britain, there was once a tendency to assume the civil service to be 
apol it ica l  (e.g., Morrison, 1964: 52, 328-31). As an ideal type, the 
model of bureaucracy assumes not only that bureaucrats are neutral with 
regard to the policy questions of the day, but also that they do not 
have personal goals that might c o n f l i c t  with the ir  public  
responsibilities. Both these assumptions are false. Bureaucrats have a 
vested interest in established routines and relationships, and in the 
policies associated with them. There often develops an agreed "c iv i l  
service" view of how things ought to be done. While these preferences 
may not be partisan in a str ict  sense, they represent a tremendous 
barrier to a party wishing to innovate. Bureaucrats also have an 
interest in converting their minister from a member of a party team into 
a spokesman for their department (Crossman, 1972: 63-65). The 
bureaucrat's private career interest gives him an incentive to defend 
his program and budget, often by building support for them outside the 
government in the form of a clientele. But as in a l l  patron-client  
relationships, the patron acquires obligations as well as support. 



























































































to obstruct party policies (Dumont, 1972).
Interest groups — The second set of potential r ivals  for party 
government is interest groups. In the party government model, groups 
should pursue their interests through parties, either by offering and 
withholding electoral support or by becoming a f f i l ia ted  with or 
penetrating a party.11* The former strategy is likely to be effective i f  
the group's support can make an appreciable difference and i f  it can be 
withheld credibly. The latter is likely to be pursued only i f  one party 
is dominant; the price of influence through one party is lack of 
influence when that party is out of office.
I f  neither of these conditions is met, and especially i f  the 
group's interests are re lative ly  narrow, a clientelistic relationship 
with the bureaucracy is  l i k e l y  to be most productive. The 
administrative problems of bureaucrats are greatly reduced i f  they can 
establish a working relationship with the representatives of the 
interest affected by their agency. The group, in return, is guaranteed 
sympathetic access to those in charge of the policies affecting them. 
Over time, the bureaucrats come to depend on their clients for political 
support and administrative assistance. The group's leadership tends to 
be coopted to a quasi-administrative perspective. As the groups leaders 
and bureaucrats move together, this kind of relationship can lead to 
party polit ic ians being presented with fa its  accomplis— policies  
agreed by the bureaucracy and the affected interests and not readily  
subject to change.
A related alternative to a clientelistic strategy is to press for 
corporatist decision-making. Again, the interest group gains direct  




























































































gains a smoothly administerable program. Establishment of corporatist 
bodies may be attractive for parties as well as a way of defusing 
opposition and coopting cr it ics .  Although this may be an ef fective  
short term strategy for the particular parties in power, in the longer 
term party government is weakened as expressions of political interest 
are no longer channeled exclusively through party. Effective adminis­
tration requires strong and well-articulated interest groups with which 
party and bureaucracy may deal, but these then become rival sources of 
power.
T e lev is ion— Finally, the third rival that requires mention is 
television journalism. This has assumed many of the functions —  
oversight, criticism, raising of issues — traditionally ascribed to the 
oppos it ion .  But unlike party opposit ions ,  t e le v is io n  is  both 
permanently in opposition, and thus never called upon to do better, and 
apparently disinterested, and thus credible (Crozier, 1975: 92; Smith, 
1979) .
Although television journalists may have particular policy views 
they would like to advance, their greatest impact on the problem of 
party government comes from their pursuit of professional goals 
(Altheide, 197*0. Television has tended to personalise po l it ics ,  
increasing the visibility of a few party leaders while diminishing the 
salience of party. Investigative reporting has decreased the anonymity 
of bureaucrats and the privacy of government. In the name of  
objectivity, television has provided a channel for bureaucrats, interest 
groups, and dissident politicians to mobilise support without the aid of 




























































































news," te lev is ion  has undermined public confidence in public  
institutions, including parties (Robinson, 1976). The immediacy of 
television news has forced party leaders to give more weight to short 
term results, to their personal images, and to goals relating to 
maintenance of their positions at the expense both of governing and of 
more general organisational goals.
This is not to suggest that television journalists have undermined 
party government intentionally. Rather, their pursuit of their own 
goals has an impact on the behavioral incentives of others to the 
detriment of party government.
Survivability
For the social theorist interested in the problem of party 
government, primary interest in survivability concerns the persistence 
of party government as a form of herrschaftsorganisation. This persis­
tence depends, however, on the aggregate decisions and behavior of 
individuals for whom the immediate concern is far more likely to be the 
survivability of their own parties. Regardless of whether office and 
party strength are instrumental or ultimate goals, they can hardly be 
ignored by politicians seeking to achieve anything through party gov­
ernment.
Survival of a party requires the conjunction of two interrelated  
conditions. First, the supporters and especially the activ ists  and 
second level leaders of the party must be suffic iently satisf ied that 
they continue to work for i t ,  and in particular that they do not 




























































































1970). How easy this w i l l  be depends both on the goals of those 
individuals and on circumstances.
One way for party leaders to minimise the risk of exit is to make 
use of voice relatively more attractive, that is by being responsive to 
the demands of their followers. This may involve substantial costs to 
the leaders, however. It reduces their autonomy, and perhaps also the 
value of party leadership. They may resist for this reason alone. The 
policy demands of party activists may also be counterproductive for 
leaders seeking to win elections or enter coalition governments. In 
single member plurality electoral systems, for example, it is well known 
that, other things being equal, parties taking moderate positions are 
more l ike ly  to win. The supporters of a single party, however, 
representing only one half  of the po l it ica l  spectrum (assuming a two 
party system) will prefer policies more extreme than those supported by 
the average voter. The response that Robertson (1976) suggests for 
party leaders is to sat isfy  their followers when an election is 
"unwinnable" or "unlosable," and to sat isfy  the voters when the 
election's outcome is in doubt. This is only possible to the extent 
that followers w i l l  allow. I f  ideological purity is excessively  
important to a party's supporters, its leaders may have no alternative 
but to take e lectora lly  disadvantageous positions and suffer the 
consequences at the polls. In general, i f  the party's followers can be 
induced to accept symbolic rewards, especially such as the value of  
party loyalty, the survivability of the party is increased.
Similar observations are relevant to professional activ ists  and 
MPs. Where policy is important but there are deep disagreements within 




























































































can best be achieved through unity, it  is easier to maintain. For 
example, discipline within British parties increases as the size of the- 
government's majority decreases, while policy differences within the 
out-o f -o f f ice  Labour movement have brought the party to the verge of 
collapse. On the continent, the Italian Christian Democrats appear 
willing to go to any lengths to remain united so long as unity 
guarantees off ice  (DiPalma, 1977). Where the perceived costs of exit 
are low, unity w i l l  be harder to maintain; where leaving the party is 
tantamount to retiring from politics, compromises will be more likely. 
This applies to party leadership as well. I f  defections are likely to 
cause loss of o f f ice ,  leaders are far more l ike ly  to defer to their 
followers (Axelrod, 1970).
Both leaders and followers are likely to find party unity easier to 
achieve when they perceive it to be in their own interests. The other 
condition for the continuance of a party system, continued electoral  
support, is related to this. It  is far easier to find reasons for 
leaving a party whose electoral support is eroding than one whose 
electoral stock is rising. This works the other way as well; a united 
party is more l ikely  to do well at the ballot  box. More importantly, 
however, electoral success is related to perceived performance in office 
— the state of the economy, prospects for war and peace, and the like. 
The problem is that these conditions may not be compatible. Thus one 
consequence of the DC's unwillingness to risk party unity by taking firm 
action has been continually eroding electoral support. From the other 
perspective, one problem for those who want to pursue conservative 




























































































the short term electoral consequences of unemployment and retrenched 
social services cause their parties to desert them or to collapse.
The second sense of survival relates to the continued adherence of 
those in power under a party government to its norms, nonsurvival in 
this sense relating to a gradual evolution to some other power 
arrangement. Party government should survive in this sense so long as 
the structure of incentives that led individuals to adopt that strategy 
remains in place. To the extent that this simply involves projecting 
the conditions for party government into the future, l i t t l e  further 
elaboration is required here. One point, however, does need to be made. 
Although party government involves costs for some people, once a system 
of party government is established, those who come to the top have a 
vested interest in its continuation, as well as in the continuation of 
their own parties. At the same time, many of the conditions of party 
government are subject to conscious manipulation. Thus barriers may be 
erected against those who attempt to pursue a nonparty strategy. The 
discrimination of most electoral systems and leg is la t ive  committee 
assignment processes against independents and adherents of small or new 
parties are two examples.
This is not to deny the possib i l ity  of changes that would lead to 
the supersession of party government by some alternative form. As 
suggested above, technological, social,  organisational, or po l i t ica l  
innovations may create new poss ib i l i t ie s  or alter the relative  
attractiveness of old ones. Some of these changes, such as the creation 
of specialist or corporatist boards, may be brought about deliberately 
by party leaders as short run responses to po l it ica l  problems. 




























































































abandon an established system of party government seems unlikely.
I f  party government is a system from which evolution through 
gradual abandonment is unlikely, the third aspect of survivability — 
avoidance of precipitate collapse —  becomes that much more relevant. 
For a political system to avoid collapse, it must maintain an adequate 
level of support. While this is hard to specify, and certainly varies 
with load and the v i s i b i l i t y  of alternatives, some level of positive  
support coupled at least with general acquiesence is necessary for a 
free government to survive. How is that support maintained, and can 
party government maintain it?
Support is correlated with performance relative to expectations. 
Assuming that a system currently has adequate support, its support could 
become inadequate as a result of any of three processes. Firstly, the 
difficulty of the problems confronting the government might increase. 
Some such increases in load may be imposed from outside the political 
system. For example, in recent times, the formation of the OPEC cartel 
and resulting dramatic increase in the price of oil has made the problem 
of economic management objectively more difficult. Similar increases in 
the objective difficulty of governing have accompanied economic depres­
sions, failed crops, and natural disasters. Other increases in load 
result from the polit ic isation of previously nonpolitical problems 
(Sjttblom, 1982). In part, this is a problem of expectations, which will 
be discussed below — natural disasters only pose a threat to the gov­
ernment i f  there is an expectation that government ought to deal with 
their consequences. This is a clear example of the political importance 



























































































hand, increases in the range of politicised problems also make governing 
generally more difficult.
Secondly, the capacity of the system could decline. While ability 
to manage problems is related to the d i f f icu lty  of the problems to be 
managed — it is unlikely that there was anything the Weimar Republic 
could have done to avoid dissatisfaction during a world-wide depression 
— equally some governments are better able than others to cope with 
problems of comparable difficulty. Conditions relating to capacity will 
be discussed in the next section.
The third situation that may endanger a system of party government 
is escalating expectations, either that the government w i l l  do more 
things than currently or that it  w i l l  do those things that it  is 
currently doing better. Expectations arise from three processes. The 
f irst  is extrapolation from the past. This source of expectations would 
be of l i t t l e  concern i f  apparently good performance necessarily  
indicated real capacity; in this case there would be every reason to 
expect performance to continue. I f ,  however, apparently good 
performance were simply the result of fortuitous circumstances, the 
system could well prove unequal to the challenge when circumstances 
become less favorable. This may be precisely the situation in which the 
western democracies currently find themselves; having taken credit for 
the economic boom of the 1960s, they must now pay the price of 
unfulfilled expectations of continued rapid growth in the late 1970s and 
1980s. And as the preceding sentence implies, this is a danger that is 
exacerbated by the electoral incentive for parties in power to claim 





























































































A second source of expectations is promises. In their campaigns, 
candidates try to convince voters that good things w i l l  result from 
their election. The danger is that expectations will be raised beyond 
the ab i l i ty  of the victorious party to perform. In several places 
Sartori (1966; 1976: 137-76) talks about the irresponsible opposition of 
extreme parties permanently excluded from office in systems of polarised 
pluralism. Knowing that they will never be called upon to deliver, they 
engage in reckless outbidding, constantly promising more and more. In 
fact, this phenomenon is limited neither to extreme parties nor to 
systems of polarised pluralism. Although unfulf i l led promises may 
ultimately undermine a party's credibility, in the short run, optimistic 
promises are beneficial;  witness the glowing economic forecasts of  
governments in power. 15 Especially for a party currently out of office, 
the temptation to promise more than it can deliver so as to win office 
can be very powerful. But this can only lead to disenchantment with the 
entire party system, or more generally with the whole idea of parties  
and party government.
Rising expectations may also be created by nonparty groups as a 
means of pressuring the government. By convincing a segment of the 
public that the government can and should do some particular thing, they 
increase the cost to the party in power of not doing it. Group leaders 
may well recognise these demands as strategic and be happy to settle for 
far less; that their followers will be equally realistic is doubtful.
Although one tends to think primarily of support from the public or 
from interest groups outside the po lit ica l  branches of government —  




























































































by those who operate it is at least as important. A problem analogous 
to a revolution of rising expectations in the mass public is the danger 
that politicians themselves may develop unrealistic expectations, or 
alternatively that the system w i l l  tend to promote politicians whose 
expectations are already unrealistic. The frustration that they expe­
rience when their expectations meet the rea l ity  of limited power can 
also have a destabilising influence.
Inadequate support, whether resulting from absolute incapacity to 
deal with social problems or simply from unrealisable expectations makes 
a political system extremely vulnerable. Whether it actually collapses 
depends on the ava i lab i l i ty  of an alternative and the presence of a 
precipitating crisis.
This discussion can be related to the four-category typology 
proposed by Gordon Smith (1981; 1982). This typology is derived from 
the intersection of two dichotomies, one based on the survival of party 
government and the other on adaptability. The four resulting types are 
defined in Table 1. Although not identical, Smith's typology f its  very 
closely with my own. The supersession category corresponds to my second 
sense of non-survival — an evolution away from party government brought 
about by politicians ceasing to follow the party government strategy.  
The rupture category relates to my third sense of non-survival — regime 
suicide or revolution. In this application of Smith's categories,  
immobilism is the situation in which support is inadequate, but no 
catalytic crisis has occurred. This highlights the significance of my 
emphasis on support as a function both of capacity (adaptability) and of 
expectations.




























































































routes by which party government might disappear. One would be movement 
directly from high association to supersession. Societal changes could 
lead politicians to abandon party government without any apparent loss 
in government efficiency or legitimacy. In this case, party government 
would adapt i t s e l f  out of existence, much as the British aristocracy  
adapted i t s e l f  to the social changes of the 18th and 19th centuries; 
while the institutions might remain, their significance would be 
thoroughly altered. The second and third routes both run through the 
immobilism category. Party politicians are unable or unwilling to adapt 
to social changes or to meet expectations. They may ultimately  
recognise the situation and adapt. Depending on the adaptation, this 
could lead to supersession (the second route) or back to high 
association. The third route would result i f  the governing elite failed 
to adapt. In this case, a c r is is  ultimately would topple the entire 
system. There is no ground to expect a possible direct movement from 
high association to rupture unless it were imposed from outside.
The particular relevance of the f i r s t  meaning of survival arises 
when one considers why politicians would fail to adapt. Historically, 
adaptation of a party system has usually meant the replacement of one 
set of dominant parties or leaders by another. Thus, although the long 
term consequences of nonadaptation may be system collapse, and total  
ruin for all  concerned, the short term consequence of adaptation may be 
very high costs for those who actually make the necessary decisions. 
They may prefer to let tomorrow take care of i t s e l f .  Again Italy  
provides an apt example. So long as the DC stays together and Italian  




























































































The DC can only stay together at the price of nonadaptation, that is by 
side-stepping the need to address fundamental problems. 'Each time they 
do this, however, the future of Italian democracy becomes more 
precarious (Battaglia, 1979).
Capacity
A party that was totally capable both at governing and at managing 
expectations and desires would never lose office. No party is totally 
capable. As suggested in the last section, there are forces inherent in 
the party government model militating against the effective management 
of expectations. There are also forces inherent in party government 
that limit its problem solution capacity.
As outlined above, problem solution capacity requires talent in a 
variety of fields and of a variety of types, cooperation especially from 
the bureaucracy, and w i l l .  Looking f i r s t  at talent, party government 
involves turning over power to the winners of elections. The skills and 
talents required for electoral success, however, are very different from 
those required for policy formulation and implementation (Cronin, 1980: 
19-22). In one respect, party government provides a solution to this 
problem. With party rather than the individual candidate the object of 
identification, e lectora lly  attractive members of the party team can 
draw support for administratively competent individuals. This is  
evident both in Britain, where unexciting candidates can be given safe 
seats (or l i f e  peerages), and in l i s t  PR systems, where they can be 
given high l i s t  positions. On the other hand, at the highest levels  
electoral talents remain more important than administrative ab i l ity .  




























































































individual "fiefdoms" or for some other reason, ministers are rotated 
rap id ly  from one department to another and thus never develop 
substantial expertise.
While this may lead to "better" policy by making the po lit ica l  
"amateurs" more dependent on the bureaucratic "professionals," only i f  
the bureaucracy is particularly loyal to, and understanding of, the 
party government of the day can this be said to contribute to party 
capacity. Here there may be a trade-off between capable government and 
party government. Similarly, rotation of ministers may further party 
unity by encouraging leaders to take a broader view, but does so at the 
expense of intimate party involvement in the making of specific  
policies.
The political heads of party governments are transient while the 
bureaucracy is permanent. Capable government requires the cooperation 
of bureaucrats. Yet the electoral responsibilities of a party give them 
an incentive to blame the bureaucracy for their failures. An example 
from the United States illustrates this problem. Said President Kennedy 
before taking a foreign policy initiative, "I hope this plan works. If  
it does, it will be another White House success. I f  it  doesn't, it will 
be another State Department fa i lure"(Cleveland, 1972: 95-96). Under 
these circumstances, self-defense by the civil service is more likely 
than loyalty.
Dependence on electoral support is a necessary condition for 
responsible party government. Nonetheless, i f  this dependence leads to 
obsession with day-by-day changes in popularity, it can lead to paraly­




























































































to achieve future benefits. I f  temporary declines in public approval 
are l ike ly  to disrupt the leadership's hold over the party, such 
policies, even when needed or rewarding in the long run, are unlikely to 
be pursued.
The w i l l  to govern is also undermined i f  the goal of maintaining 
party unity must be given substantially higher priority than policy 
goals. Party government is government by a team. This creates problems 
of coordination and internal politics. Cabinet ministers, for example, 
ordinarily owe their o f f i c i a l  positions at least in part to their 
independent personal support within the party; i f  a single party leader 
could ignore one or two of them, he can hardly ignore them a l l  and 
expect to remain as leader. Policy must be formed through a continuous 
process of negotiation and accommodation, a process hardly calculated to 
achieve consistent or entirely efficient results.
Party government breeds a crisis mentality and a tendency never to 
deal with a problem before it  becomes a cr is is .  Personal rewards for 
resolving a crisis, which is obvious, are greater than for avoiding one, 
which is not. The status, power, and budgets of those who must deal 
with crises, whether they are successful or not, are greater than those 
given to merely "competent administrators." The internal compromises 
necessary to policy making are easier to achieve in a crisis, when the 
need for an immediate decision is clear, than at other times. Promoting 
a feeling of crisis can be an effective strategy for mobilising public 





























































































The central message of this paper is that party government should 
be explained and its future projected by focussing on the people who 
make up the parties, and especially on the party leaders who also f i l l  
the central governing roles i f  there is party government, as individuals 
rather than on the parties as institutions. Although party government 
may be "functional" for a democratic system, adherence to the party 
government model as well as the very existence of po l i t ica l  parties 
comes about, i f  at a l l ,  not because of this but because individuals  
pursuing their personal goals find party and party government to be 
rewarding. Prediction and explanation must be based on the goals being 
pursued by those in power and the relative effectiveness of alternative 
strategies open to them as determined by resources, environmental 
conditions, and the goals, strategies, and resources of competing 
actors. The specific hypotheses or suggestions raised above illustrate  
this approach and need not be repeated here.
I f  a l l  relevant actors adhered to the norms of party government, 
the capacity and survivability of the system would be limited only by 
the wisdom of voters and politicians. Moreover, i f  the social  
preconditions tacitly assumed by the party government model were met and 
its conception of democracy accepted, the result would be democratic as 
well. The problems are that the social preconditions of the model are 
satisf ied decreasingly by postindustrial societies, that the party 
government conception of democracy is debatable, and that given 




























































































within each party, and even within a single individual, a structure of 
incentives encouraging party government-like behavior often is lacking.
The negative consequences of ineffective government touch everyone • 
in society. Interest groups, media, voters, and politicians all have a 
long term interest in avoiding system collapse. They do not necessarily 
have an interest in party government, and certainly may have no interest 
in the survival of the current party system. Even leaders of the 
currently dominant parties have other interests as well. The problem of 
party government, as of a l l  systems of government, is to arrange a 
structure of incentives that encourages politicians to value long term 
policy and governing goals over short term power and personal goals; the 
paradox is that many features of the party government model naturally 





























































































throughout this paper, I intend to limit attention to democratic 
governments, thus ignoring questions of whether totalitarian parties are 
properly parties and whether government by such parties is party govern­
ment. For a discussion of these issues, see Sartori (1976).
^Ronald Rogowski (1974: 32). When the individuals in question are 
in competition, as in the economy or electoral politics, one ground for 
believing that they w i l l  behave, for whatever reason, as i f  they were 
making careful cost-benefit calculations is that those who do not behave 
"rationally" will not survive.
^An appealing way to conceive and measure party government would be 
to identify the goals of those parties in power and the goals of r iva l  
organisations or structures, and then to compare outcomes with those 
goals; the closer the f i t  of results to party goals, the more party 
government there must have been. This approach is precluded, however, 
by the indeterminacy of the goals of the party. '
The term "system" is used here only to mean the collection of 
political institutions and activities. It is not meant to imply any of 
the systematic interconnections implicit in systems theory or the sys­
tems approach.
^See Ostrogorski (1964). This view contrasts with Eldersveld’s 
(1964: 2) assertion that "Parties came into existence to perform certain 
functions for the system."
^Systems with plural executives, even i f  directly elected, would be 




























































































dent was elected by an independent electoral college (e.g., Finland).
7
'This means only that generalisations about the behavior of parties 
and party politicians or activists may not apply to these groups, and 
does not imply any normative judgment about them.
^Entrusting courts with rule making authority thus violates this 
condition of-party government unless the judges are chosen in partisan 
elections or removable in the normal course of politics. Recognition of 
this suggests that strict adherence to the norms of party government may
not be entirely desirable.
g
Lijphart’s (1975) description of consociationalism in the Nether­
lands as government by elite cartel f its nicely with the party govern­
ment model to the extent that party elites were the leading figures in 
each social pillar. The Swiss system described by Steiner (197*0 fits  
far less well.
^Although clearly a d i f f i c u l t  problem, the importance of distin­
guishing between policies as means and final end states as desiderata is 
underlined by Robertson (1976).
^The term "supersession" is borrowed from Smith (1982). My use of 
i t ,  however, while strongly influenced by his, is not identical to it .  
See below.
1 p
Whether such organisations should be called parties within the 
framework suggested above is irrelevant here. The point is simply to 
demonstrate that political activity is often motivated by desires other
than office.
1RThe f i r s t  phrase is John F. Kennedy's ( 1956); the second is from 
William S. Gilbert, The Mikado.




























































































(l iterally, kinsfolk) to describe the latter strategy.
1̂ The problem is made more difficult by the fact that expectations 
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